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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
OPINION LETTER
PatriciaM. Wald*
Honorable Harley 0. Staggers
Chairman
Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This is in response to your request for the views of the Department of justice on H.R. 13921 and H.R. 13922, which were introduced during the 95th Congress, and which we understand will be
reintroduced in the 96th Congress. Both bills would amend the
Federal Trade Commission Act to impose certain reporting requirements on United States entities with respect to restrictive
business practices abroad. They would also enact other provisions
to combat such practices.
H.R. 13921 would require a United States entity to report to the
Federal Trade Commission (1) whenever such entity or its foreign
subsidiary engages in restrictive business practices by reason of
any foreign governmental requirement, or is directly or indirectly
requested by a foreign government to engage in restrictive business
practices, or (2) whenever a joint venture, in which the United
States entity participates with a foreign concern, engages in restrictive business practices. The Federal Trade Commission would
then be obliged to notify the Attorney General, the Secretary of
State, and the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations of
the activities reported to the Commission by the United States
entity. Failure to report these activities to the FTC would subject
the entity to a civil fine of up to $1 million, while any officer or
director of the entity who knowingly fails to make the report would
be subject to a fine of up to $25,000, with no right of indemnification. H.R. 13921 would also forbid courts from recognizing the act
of state doctrine as a basis for declining to determine the merits
* This letter was submitted to the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce by Assistant Attorney General Patricia M. Wald on 23 April 1979.
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of a case involving any of the federal antitrust laws.
H.R. 13922 is identical to H.R. 13921 in imposing reporting requirements on U.S. entities. However, the former bill would also
direct the President to try to negotiate with the signatory countries
of GATT an international agreement prohibiting restrictive business practices. By such agreement, each signatory country would
be obliged to enact and enforce legislation forbidding persons subject to its jurisdiction from engaging in such practices. Moreover,
H.R. 13922 would amend §301(a) of the 1974 Trade Act to authorize the President to impose certain trade sanctions on countries
that either engage in restrictive business practices or directly or
indirectly require U.S. entities to engage in such practices.
The Department of Justice shares with the sponsors of these bills
their concern about anticompetitive practices in international
markets and the important challenge to U.S. antitrust enforcement posed by increasing involvement of governments in the conduct of international trade. The problems of the nature and scope
of antitrust enforcement in cases where foreign governments are
implicated is a difficult one deserving careful consideration. It
should at the outset be noted, however, that most nations are not
as committed as the United States to competition and open markets as a principle of economic order. Indeed many countries, including some of our closest allies, frequently regard their encouragement of certain measures that might have anticompetitive effects as both appropriate and necessary for the orderly development of their respective economies. Furthermore, most nations
object to the notion that another sovereign has the jurisdiction to
enforce and adjudicate rules of law applicable to activities occurring outside that sovereign's territory. This objection to an
"extraterritorial" application of one nation's laws to entities
abroad, even if they are subsidiaries controlled by nationals of the
prescribing state, is particularly strenuous when the law can be
criminally enforced, as can the antitrust laws. There is no widespread acceptance of the United States' position with respect to
jurisdictional claims over certain restrictive business practices
abroad. We must therefore be mindful of considerations of comity
and the need to minimize, when possible, the potential for conflict
with a legitimately exercised right of a foreign sovereign.
The Department believes that notification, similar to that envisioned by H.R. 13921 and H.R. 13922 could indeed, as Congressman Gore noted in introducing the bill, help deter future foreign
government-induced cartel activities by making such activities
more transparent. A major obstacle to effective enforcement of
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U.S. antitrust laws has been the clandestine manner in which
participants in some recent international cartels joined together
and operated. This obstacle would be substantially eroded if U.S.
entities were required to report to U.S. antitrust agencies whenever
privately directed or solicited, e.g., through a foreign subsidiary by
a foreign government, to engage in cartel-like activities substantially affecting U.S. commerce. The U.S. agencies would then be
in a position to consult, if deemed necessary, with the foreign
government to attempt to minimize the adverse effects on U.S.
commerce. If necessary of course, they would be in a better position
to institute legal proceedings against illegal activities.
While the Justice Department favors the concept of a reporting
requirement as to cartel participation imposed on U.S. entities
operating abroad, and agrees that it could go far toward eliminating secret cartels from world trade, several important problems
raised by H.R. 13921 and H.R. 13922 prevent the Department from
supporting the reporting requirement, or the bills as a whole, as
presently drafted.
H.R. 13922 and H.R. 13921 introduce four methods of dealing
with restrictive business practices in international trade and with
the problem posed by government participation in such practices:
(1) a notification system of restrictive business practices; (2) withdrawal of the act of state defense in antitrust actions; (3) an international agreement on restrictive business practices; and (4)
amendment of the Trade Act to permit sanctions against countries
that engage in restrictive business practices affecting the United
States or require U.S. companies to engage in such practices. Each
of these four methods will be considered separately.
Notification System
H.R. 13921 and H.R. 13922 if enacted would require U.S. entities
to report to U.S. antitrust agencies whenever they are directed or
solicited, e.g., through a foreign subsidiary by a foreign government, to engage in anticompetitive restrictive business practices
affecting U.S. commerce. However, a notification system of this
type raises the following concerns: First, an insufficiently focused
notification requirement for companies engaged in or aware of restrictive business practices represents a significant departure from
longstanding U.S. antitrust enforcement practice and philosophy.
It could unduly burden both the international business community
and law enforcement agencies. Considerable antitrust resources
could be expended reviewing the material submitted, and failure
to act within a certain time may raise a question of estoppel or may
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significantly impede the business community from proceeding productively with international business arrangements. The single
exception to the traditional non-notification approach to antitrust
enforcement has been premerger notification. There, however,
after lengthy study of the issue, the desire of both the enforcement
agencies and the parties to mergers for a prior determination of
legality, and the difficulty of undoing the effects of the merger once
it has already taken place, were held to be overriding considerations.
Second, a reporting requirement may raise a problem with
friendly governments. Such requirements could endanger the level
of cooperation the Department of Justice has already reached with
some friendly countries and may only exacerbate tensions that
exist with others over U.S. anitrust enforcement. It can be anticipated that a reporting requirement would conflict with many foreign secrecy laws if foreign sovereigns are involved. This, of course,
would put many U.S. corporations in a difficult middle ground
between conflicting laws.
Third, H.R. 13921 and H.R. 13922 offer an excessively broad list
of restrictive business practices. A more appropriate definition of
the term would focus on government-initiated price fixing, production quotas, market restrictions and group boycotts to be implemented by commercial entities in international markets. These
practices generally fall within the scope of cartel-like practices
likely to have a significant adverse impact on U.S. commerce.
The notification requirement need not be as broad as the full
jurisdictional reach of U.S. antitrust laws. Logically, therefore,
notification should not exceed the scope of underlying U.S. jurisdiction. However, several of the practices referred to in the bills
appear to do just this. For example, "discriminating against particular enterprises" appears to refer to the Robinson-Patman Act,
which does not apply to acts committed abroad. The notification
system would therefore be broader than underlying U.S. law. For
another example, the bills' reporting requirement would apply in
any case in which a U.S. corporation or its foreign subsidiary engages in a restrictive business practice because of a requirement of
the government of a foreign country, or is requested to engage in
such practices by the government of the foreign country. No provision is made in the bills limiting the reporting requirement to those
practices as defined that have substantial and foreseeable effect on
U.S. commerce.
As stated in the Department's Antitrust Guide for International
Operations,judicial precedent has established that "the U.S. anti-
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trust laws should be applied to an overseas transaction when there
is a substantial and foreseeable effect on the United States commerce; and consistent with these ends, it should avoid unnecessary
interference with the sovereign interests of foreign nations" (at 67). In order to be consistent with the Sherman Act, any reporting
requirement should be limited to those restrictive business practices that have some substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect
on U.S. commerce.
Fourth, the bills appear to impose a strict standard of liability
for failure to report, even though there may be instances in which
an enterprise was unaware that a foreign government had
"indirectly required" its participation in a restrictive business
practice. A possible solution to this problem would be a triggering
mechanism whereby liability would attach only if a management
executive of an entity knew or had reason to know of the reportable
event. There could, however, be a presumption of knowledge where
evidence of notice to the entity existed. The entity could then have
the burden of rebutting this presumption. The problem of adequate notice may be particularly severe in the case of joint ventures in which a company has only a minor interest, but would be
required by the bills to report any restrictive business practices in
which the joint venture engages, even if there had not been any
foreign government involvement. Such a statutory requirement
may be inequitable, particularly since officials of the U.S. entity
may not have knowledge of the restrictive business practices of its
foreign joint venture, even though the entity would nevertheless be
exposed to a possible $1 million fine for failure to report.
Fifth, the reporting requirements of the proposed legislation include not only restrictive business practices that are the result of
secret directives or requests by a foreign government to a U.S.
entity or its foreign subsidiary, but also restrictive business practices resulting from government regulations or communications
made in the public sector and thus open for public inspection.
Inasmuch as one of the primary objectives of H.R. 13921 and H.R.
13922 is to remove the secrecy frequently surrounding the formation and operation of international cartels, it would not seem necessary to require U.S. entities to report public regulations or communications.
Finally, although the FTC and the Justice Department have
concurrent antitrust jurisdiction over international resrictive business practices affecting U.S. commerce, the Department over the
years has developed a particular expertise and has devoted greater
resources to investigating and prosecuting such practices. In mat-

328

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 12:323

ters of a criminal antitrust nature, the Department has sole enforcement responsibility. Consequently, it would be appropriate
for the U.S. entity to be required to notify the Department at the
same time it submits notice to the Federal Trade Commission.
Such a scheme could be modelled after that contained in the HartScott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 that calls for
simultaneous notification to the Justice Department and FTC regarding certain premerger activities.
In sum, the Department does not support enactment of the reporting requirements in H.R. 13921 and H.R. 13922, but does believe further study into the need for and scope of a reporting system
is warranted.
Act of State
Both bills have an identical provision (Section 2 of H.R. 13921
and Section 4 of H.R. 13922) to prevent courts from declining to
make a determination on the merits in antitrust cases on the
grounds of the "Federal act of state doctrine."
The bill's reference to the "Federal act of state doctrine" is
undesirably ambiguous. One meaning of the "act of state" doctrine
is the holding in certain cases, such as Sabbatino,that U.S. courts
will not examine whether a foreign expropriation of property violates customary international law.' Some courts have expanded
the doctrine to bar examination of whether a foreign act of state is
2
legal or illegal under that foreign country's laws.
Most antitrust cases, even those involving foreign commerce, are
not against sovereigns3 and do not involve a challenge to the validity of a foreign act of state or a contention that such act was
contrary to international law. On the other hand, in many antitrust cases, the defense is raised that the injury to competition
resulted from the sovereign act of a government, whether Federal,
State or foreign, and is thus not cognizable under the Sherman
Act, regardless of whether such act of state was somehow induced
by the defendant. When such act of state is of a sovereign and
discretionary nature and is within the power and jurisdiction of the
1. Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
2. See Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp.
1291 (D. Del. 1970).
3. In the event of an antitrust suit against a foreign government or agency,
the issue of the standards to apply has already been partially clarified by the

Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.
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state or nation that did it, U.S. courts and the Antitrust Division
may accept such a defense as fitting and proper. One ground for
this determination is that the Sherman Act is aimed at commercial
restraints motivated by business, not public, motives.
Thus, if on the one hand, the ambiguous language in these bills
were interpreted to require courts to examine the merits of any
Sabbatino-type "act of state" defenses, this would probably have
very little significance, and would be raised in very few antitrust
cases. If the language were interpreted to cast doubt on all "acts
of state" as Sherman Act defenses, we believe such result would
be undesirable. The Antitrust Division is working to keep the defense within proper bounds, but we believe this can best be done
on a case-by-case enforcement or adjudicative basis, since this area
requires fine distinctions based on detailed factual analysis. Moreover, refusal to apply American antitrust law may be mandated
not only by an "act of state" doctrine but also by considerations
of comity, which some courts have held should be a factor in determining the application of our antitrust laws to a foreign transaction.'
There are certain difficulties with the antitrust application of
the act of state doctrine development by a few lower courts. We
do not believe, as a few decisions suggest, that the purpose of this
doctrine was to bar all judicial scrutiny of the actions of foreign
governments or prevent examination of the circumstances leading
to such actions. Such dispassionate examination need not call into
question the legality or legitimacy of those acts, but ought to permit a court to seek a factual understanding of the nature and
genesis of those actions in order to determine whether an antitrust
charge will stand, not against the foreign government, but against
those allegedly procuring its actions.
This is the position which the Department of Justice has espoused in its amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court in Hunt v.
Mobil Oil Corporation.5 The Second Circuit there has held that the
act of state doctrine prevented inquiry into the causal link between
expropriation of the plaintiff's oil concessions and alleged actions
taken by the defendants to procure the seizure. The Supreme
Court denied certiorari in that case; but we do not accept the
validity of the Second Circuit rule. In antitrust act of state cases,

4. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.
1976).
5. 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
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there is always an issue as to whether the antitrust injury was
caused by the act of a sovereign or the act of private persons. It
was the position of the Department of Justice that mere presence
of a sovereign act in the factual chain of anticompetitive conduct
should not preclude a court from inquiring into the responsible
cause of the relevant injury.
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the Department is
concerned with any overly broad application of the act of state
doctrine; nevertheless we believe that the solution offered by H.R.
13922 is itself overbroad and inappropriate at the present time.
Agreement on InternationalProhibitions
Against Restrictive Business Practices
Section 2 of H.R. 13922 would require the President to convene
a conference of the signatory countries of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade for the purpose of reaching an agreement on
international prohibitions against restrictive business practices.
The Justice Department fully supports the idea of reaching such
an agreement. However, we believe that an undertaking as required by H.R. 13922 would duplicate existing multilateral efforts
to reach an international agreement on restrictive business practices.
The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department heads the U.S.
delegation to the OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices that has been working for the past 12-15 years to
elaborate minimum competition standards, including standards
for multinationals. Work on developing international antitrust
principles has also been done at the United Nations level within
the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). UNCTAD has two committees concerned with competition principles,
one to work on rules and principles on restrictive business practices, and the other to develop a code of conduct on transfer of
technology. In addition, the Commission on Transnational Corporations, established as an arm of the Secretariat of the United
Nations, has begun work on a code of conduct for multinationals
that will address a broad range of corporate behavior.
There has been modest success in all these fora. At the OECD,
the set of principles for multinationals adopted in 1976 is currently
undergoing review and the OECD Council Recommendations on
International Cooperation in Antitrust Matters are being revised
and strengthened. The code of conduct on transfer of technology,
developed in UNCTAD, currently is the subject of a U.S. negotiating conference, and it is expected that there will be a multilateral
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negotiating conference on the set of principles and rules on restrictive business practices in the fall of 1979. Although it has been the
U.S. position that the principles and rules or codes of conduct
should be voluntary guidelines, it is possible that these documents
will affect the development of national legislation on restrictive
business practices without there being any requirement that they
be enacted into national legislation, as H.R. 13922 proposes.
In spite of the considerable activity in this area, reaching an
international agreement in the area of restrictive business practices is a difficult and slow process. Widely divergent views are
held by members within the international community regarding
the perceived need for prohibitions against certain business practices which the United States and a few other nations have categorized as anticompetitive and illegal. Differences also remain on
issues such as whether all transactions between a subsidiary and
parent should be treated the same for antitrust purposes as those
between unaffiliated enterprises and on the issue of special treatment for the enterprises of developing countries. The considerable
flexibility in our negotiation stance, required in order to take into
account the interests of other nations, may be lost if reaching an
agreement is necessary under the law. It has not appeared practical to any developed country that binding rules can be acceptably
negotiated as a first step. Agreement on implementation must
occur gradually when and if nations converge toward free market
principles and acceptance of fair international procedures.
Constitutional limitations also militate against enactment of
this provision of H.R. 13922. The provision for an international
agreement can be read as an attempt to dictate that an agreement
on restrictive business practices shall be made by executive agreement and shall be subject to the bill. Although Congress, if it
wishes, can authorize the President to enter particular kinds of
executive agreements, it cannot deprive him of the option of concluding treaties which, of course, are only subject to the requirement that they receive the advice and consent of the Senate. (Art.
II, §2, U.S. Const.)
Amendment of the Trade Act
Section 3 of H.R. 13922 would amend the Trade Act of 1974
specifically to permit the President to impose trade sanctions
against countries that engage in restrictive business practices affecting United States commerce or require United States companies to engage in such practices. Section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974, 19 U.S.C. 2411(a)(2), permits the President to take certain
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retaliatory action already against the trade of other countries
whenever he determines that they are engaged in "discriminatory
or other acts or policies which are unjustifiable or unreasonable
and which burden or restrict United States commerce." Prior to
the exercise of such power, the President must provide an opportunity for the presentation of views concerning those restrictions,
acts or policies. Based upon the adequacy of the existing statute,
it is the Justice Department's view that no amendment of the
Trade Act is necessary to accomplish the purpose of Section 3 of
this bill.
Conclusion
In sum, the Department of Justice supports the main purpose
of these bills, that is, expeditious exposure of, and effective opposition to, secret cartel arrangements supported by foreign governments that cause direct injury in U. S. commerce. The Department
of Justice also welcomes support for accelerated efforts toward
international resolution of restrictive anticompetitive business
practices. However, the Department, for the reasons stated above,
recommends against enactment of H.R. 13921 and H.R. 13922 in
their present forms.
We do believe the continued exploration and discussion of the
need for enactment of a reporting requirement for foreign,
governmentally-involved, cartels would be worthwhile. We have
also noted the possible desirability of a Congressional resolution
favoring negotiation of international antitrust rules.
The Office of Management and Budget has advised that there
is no objection to the submission of this report from the standpoint
of the Administration's program.
Sincerely,
(Signed) Patricia M. Wald
Patricia M. Wald
Assistant Attorney General

